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Abstract 
The WTO is a place where member governments go, to try to sort out the trade problems they face with each 
other. At its heart are WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations. But the 
WTO is not just about liberalizing trade, and in some circumstances its rules support maintaining trade barriers 
— for example to protect consumers or prevent the spread of disease. 
The WTO was born out of negotiations; everything the WTO does is the result of negotiations, this article tries 
to answer the question what is the World Trade Organization? Simply put: the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
deals with the rules of trade between nations at a global or near-global level. But there is more to it than that. 
And tries to answer another question: Is it a bird, is it a plane? There are a number of ways of looking at the 
WTO. It’s an organization for liberalizing trade. It’s a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements. It’s 
a place for them to settle trade disputes. It operates a system of trade rules. (But it’s not Superman, just in case 
anyone thought it could solve — or cause — all the world’s problems!). 
Keywords’: WTO, negotiations, governments, liberalizing trade, Organization, settle disputes, GATT.  
 
1. Introduction 
What is the World Trade Organization? Simply put: the World Trade Organization (WTO) deals with the rules 
of trade between nations at a global or near-global level. But there is more to it than that. Is it a bird, is it a 
plane? There are a number of ways of looking at the WTO. It’s an organization for liberalizing trade. It’s a 
forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements. It’s a place for them to settle trade disputes. It operates a 
system of trade rules. (But it’s not Superman, just in case anyone thought it could solve — or cause — all the 
world’s problems!). 
Above all, it’s a negotiating forum; essentially, the WTO is a place where member governments go, to try to sort 
out the trade problems they face with each other. The first step is to talk. The WTO was born out of negotiations, 
and everything the WTO does is the result of negotiations. The bulk of the WTO’s current work comes from the 
1986–94 negotiations called the Uruguay Round and earlier negotiations under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is currently the host to new negotiations, under the “Doha Development 
Agenda” launched in 2001. 
Where countries have faced trade barriers and wanted them lowered, the negotiations have helped to liberalize 
trade. But the WTO is not just about liberalizing trade, and in some circumstances its rules support maintaining 
trade barriers — for example to protect consumers or prevent the spread of disease. 
It’s a set of rules, at its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading 
nations. These documents provide the legal ground-rules for international commerce. They are essentially 
contracts, binding governments to keep their trade policies within agreed limits. Although negotiated and signed 
by governments, the goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their 
business, while allowing governments to meet social and environmental objectives. 
The system’s overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible — so long as there are no undesirable 
side-effects. That partly means removing obstacles. It also means ensuring that individuals, companies and 
governments know what the trade rules are around the world, and giving them the confidence that there will be 
no sudden changes of policy. In other words, the rules have to be “transparent” and predictable. 
And it helps to settle disputes; this is a third important side to the WTO’s work. Trade relations often involve 
conflicting interests. Agreements, including those painstakingly negotiated in the WTO system, often need 
interpreting. The most harmonious way to settle these differences is through some neutral procedure based on an 
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agreed legal foundation. That is the purpose behind the dispute settlement process written into the WTO 
agreements. 
2. When The WTO began life 
The WTO began life on 1 January 1995, but its trading system is half a century older. Since 1948, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had provided the rules for the system. (The second WTO ministerial 
meeting, held in Geneva in May 1998, included a celebration of the 50th anniversary of the system), It did not 
take long for the General Agreement to give birth to an unofficial, de facto international organization, also 
known informally as GATT. Over the years GATT evolved through several rounds of negotiations. 
The last and largest GATT round, was the Uruguay Round which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and led to the 
WTO’s creation. Whereas GATT had mainly dealt with trade in goods, the WTO and its agreements now cover 
trade in services, and in traded inventions, creations and designs (intellectual property). 
3. Principles of the trading system 
The WTO agreements are lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a wide range of activities. 
They deal with: agriculture, textiles and clothing, banking, telecommunications, government purchases, 
industrial standards and product safety, food sanitation regulations, intellectual property, and much more. But a 
number of simple, fundamental principles run throughout all of these documents. These principles are the 
foundation of the multilateral trading system. 
3.1. (MFN): treating other people equally     : 
Under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners. Grant 
someone a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products) and you have to do the 
same for all other WTO members. 
This principle is known as most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment (see box). It is so important that it is the first 
article of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which governs trade in goods. MFN is also a 
priority in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Article 2) and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Article 4), although in each agreement the principle is handled 
slightly differently. Together, those three agreements cover all three main areas of trade handled by the WTO. 
Some exceptions are allowed. For example, countries can set up a free trade agreement that applies only to goods 
traded within the group — discriminating against goods from outside. Or they can give developing countries 
special access to their markets. Or a country can raise barriers against products that are considered to be traded 
unfairly from specific countries. And in services, countries are allowed, in limited circumstances, to 
discriminate. But the agreements only permit these exceptions under strict conditions. In general, MFN means 
that every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to do so for the same goods or 
services from all its trading partners — whether rich or poor, weak or strong. 
3.2. National treatment: Treating foreigners and locals equally        
Imported and locally-produced goods should be treated equally — at least after the foreign goods have entered 
the market. The same should apply to foreign and domestic services, and to foreign and local trademarks, 
copyrights and patents. This principle of “national treatment” (giving others the same treatment as one’s own 
nationals) is also found in all the three main WTO agreements (Article 3 of GATT, Article 17 of GATS and 
Article 3 of TRIPS), although once again the principle is handled slightly differently in each of these. 
National treatment only applies once a product, service or item of intellectual property has entered the market. 
Therefore, charging customs duty on an import is not a violation of national treatment even if locally-produced 
products are not charged an equivalent tax. 
3.3. Freer trade: gradually, through negotiation 
Lowering trade barriers is one of the most obvious means of encouraging trade. The barriers concerned include 
customs duties (or tariffs) and measures such as import bans or quotas that restrict quantities selectively. From 
time to time other issues such as red tape and exchange rate policies have also been discussed. 
Since GATT’s creation in 1947–48 there have been eight rounds of trade negotiations. A ninth round, under the 
Doha Development Agenda, is now underway. At first these focused on lowering tariffs (customs duties) on 
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imported goods. As a result of the negotiations, by the mid-1990s industrial countries’ tariff rates on industrial 
goods had fallen steadily to less than 4%. 
But by the 1980s, the negotiations had expanded to cover non-tariff barriers on goods, and to the new areas such 
as services and intellectual property. 
Opening markets can be beneficial, but it also requires adjustment. The WTO agreements allow countries to 
introduce changes gradually, through “progressive liberalization”. Developing countries are usually given longer 
to fulfill their obligations. 
3.4. Predictability: through binding and transparency 
Sometimes, promising not to raise a trade barrier can be as important as lowering one, because the promise gives 
businesses a clearer view of their future opportunities. With stability and predictability, investment is 
encouraged, jobs are created and consumers can fully enjoy the benefits of competition — choice and lower 
prices. The multilateral trading system is an attempt by governments to make the business environment stable 
and predictable. 
In the WTO, when countries agree to open their markets for goods or services, they “bind” their commitments. 
For goods, these bindings amount to ceilings on customs tariff rates. Sometimes countries tax imports at rates 
that are lower than the bound rates. Frequently this is the case in developing countries. In developed countries 
the rates actually charged and the bound rates tend to be the same. 
A country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading partners, which could mean 
compensating them for loss of trade. One of the achievements of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks 
was to increase the amount of trade under binding commitments (see table). In agriculture, 100% of products 
now have bound tariffs. The result of all this: a substantially higher degree of market security for traders and 
investors. 
The system tries to improve predictability and stability in other ways as well. One way is to discourage the use of 
quotas and other measures used to set limits on quantities of imports — administering quotas can lead to more 
red-tape and accusations of unfair play. Another is to make countries’ trade rules as clear and public 
(“transparent”) as possible. Many WTO agreements require governments to disclose their policies and practices 
publicly within the country or by notifying the WTO. The regular surveillance of national trade policies through 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism provides a further means of encouraging transparency both domestically 
and at the multilateral level. 
3.5. Promoting fair competition 
The WTO is sometimes described as a “free trade” institution, but that is not entirely accurate. The system does 
allow tariffs and, in limited circumstances, other forms of protection. More accurately, it is a system of rules 
dedicated to open, fair and undistorted competition. 
The rules on non-discrimination — MFN and national treatment — are designed to secure fair conditions of 
trade. So too are those on dumping (exporting at below cost to gain market share) and subsidies. The issues are 
complex, and the rules try to establish what is fair or unfair, and how governments can respond, in particular by 
charging additional import duties calculated to compensate for damage caused by unfair trade. 
Many of the other WTO agreements aim to support fair competition: in agriculture, intellectual property, 
services, for example. The agreement on government procurement (a “plurilateral” agreement because it is 
signed by only a few WTO members) extends competition rules to purchases by thousands of government 
entities in many countries. And so on. 
3.6. Encouraging development and economic reform 
The WTO system contributes to development. On the other hand, developing countries need flexibility in the 
time they take to implement the system’s agreements. And the agreements themselves inherit the earlier 
provisions of GATT that allow for special assistance and trade concessions for developing countries. 
Over three quarters of WTO members are developing countries and countries in transition to market economies. 
During the seven and a half years of the Uruguay Round, over 60 of these countries implemented trade 
liberalization programmers autonomously. At the same time, developing countries and transition economies 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.41, 2016 
 
52 
were much more active and influential in the Uruguay Round negotiations than in any previous round, and they 
are even more so in the current Doha Development Agenda. 
At the end of the Uruguay Round, developing countries were prepared to take on most of the obligations that are 
required of developed countries. But the agreements did give them transition periods to adjust to the more 
unfamiliar and, perhaps, difficult WTO provisions — particularly so for the poorest, “least-developed” countries, 
a ministerial decision adopted at the end of the round says better-off countries should accelerate implementing 
market access commitments on goods exported by the least-developed countries, and it seeks increased technical 
assistance for them. More recently, developed countries have started to allow duty-free and quota-free imports 
for almost all products from least-developed countries. On all of this, the WTO and its members are still going 
through a learning process. The current Doha Development Agenda includes developing countries’ concerns 
about the difficulties they face in implementing the Uruguay Round agreements. 
Figure (1): The Uruguay Round increased bindings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The case for open trade 
The economic case for an open trading system based on multilaterally agreed rules is simple enough and rests 
largely on commercial common sense. But it is also supported by evidence: the experience of world trade and 
economic growth since the Second World War. Tariffs on industrial products have fallen steeply and now 
average less than 5% in industrial countries. During the first 25 years after the war, world economic growth 
averaged about 5% per year, a high rate that was partly the result of lower trade barriers. World trade grew even 
faster, averaging about 8% during the period. 
The data show a definite statistical link between freer trade and economic growth. Economic theory points to 
strong reasons for the link. All countries, including the poorest, have assets — human, industrial, natural, 
financial — which they can employ to produce goods and services for their domestic markets or to compete 
overseas. Economics tells us that we can benefit when these goods and services are traded. Simply put, the 
principle of “comparative advantage” says that countries prosper first by taking advantage of their assets in order 
to concentrate on what they can produce best, and then by trading these products for products that other countries 
produce best. 
In other words, liberal trade policies — policies that allow the unrestricted flow of goods and services — sharpen 
competition, motivate innovation and breed success. They multiply the rewards that result from producing the 
best products, with the best design, at the best price.  
But success in trade is not static. The ability to compete well in particular products can shift from company to 
company when the market changes or new technologies make cheaper and better products possible. Producers 
are encouraged to adapt gradually and in a relatively painless way. They can focus on new products, find a new 
“niche” in their current area or expand into new areas. 
Experience shows that competitiveness can also shift between whole countries. A country that may have enjoyed 
an advantage because of lower labour costs or because it had good supplies of some natural resources, could also 
become uncompetitive in some goods or services as its economy develops. However, with the stimulus of an 
open economy, the country can move on to become competitive in some other goods or services. This is 
normally a gradual process. 
Nevertheless, the temptation to ward off the challenge of competitive imports is always present. And richer 
governments are more likely to yield to the siren call of protectionism, for short term political gain — through 
The Uruguay Round 
increased bindings 
Percentages of tariffs bound before and after the 1986–94 talks 
 Before After 
Developed countries 78  99 
Developing countries 21 73 
Transition economies 73 98 
(These are tariff lines, so percentages are not weighted according to trade volume or value) 
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subsidies, complicated red tape, and hiding behind legitimate policy objectives such as environmental 
preservation or consumer protection as an excuse to protect producers. 
Protection ultimately leads to bloated, inefficient producers supplying consumers with outdated, unattractive 
products. In the end, factories close and jobs are lost despite the protection and subsidies. If other governments 
around the world pursue the same policies, markets contract and world economic activity is reduced. One of the 
objectives that governments bring to WTO negotiations is to prevent such a self-defeating and destructive drift 
into protectionism. 
Figure (2): World trade and production have accelerated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
World trade and production have accelerated 
Both trade and GDP fell in the late 1920s, before bottoming out in 1932. After World War II, both 
have risen exponentially, most of the time with trade outpacing GDP. 
(1950 = 100. Trade and GDP: log scale) 
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Table (1): Comparative advantage 
Comparative advantage 
This is arguably the single most powerful 
insight into economics. 
Suppose country A is better than country B at 
making automobiles, and country B is better 
than country A at making bread. It is obvious 
(the academics would say “trivial”) that both 
would benefit if A specialized in 
automobiles, B specialized in bread and they 
traded their products. That is a case of 
absolute advantage. 
But what if a country is bad at making 
everything? Will trade drive all producers out 
of business? The answer, according to 
Ricardo, is no. The reason is the principle of 
comparative advantage. 
It says, countries A and B still stand to 
benefit from trading with each other even if 
A is better than B at making everything. If A 
is much more superior at making automobiles 
and only slightly 
 
superior at making bread, then A should still invest 
resources in what it does best — producing 
automobiles — and export the product to B. B 
should still invest in what it does best — making 
bread — and export that product to A, even if it is 
not as efficient as A. Both would still benefit from 
the trade. A country does not have to be best at 
anything to gain from trade. That is comparative 
advantage. 
The theory dates back to classical economist David 
Ricardo. It is one of the most widely accepted 
among economists. It is also one of the most 
misunderstood among non-economists because it is 
confused with absolute advantage. 
It is often claimed, for example, that some countries 
have no comparative advantage in anything. That is 
virtually impossible. 
Think about it ... 
 
5. The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh 
The WTO’s creation on 1 January 1995 marked the biggest reform of international trade since after the Second 
World War. It also brought to reality — in an updated form — the failed attempt in 1948 to create an 
International Trade Organization. 
Much of the history of those 47 years was written in Geneva. But it also traces a journey that spanned the 
continents, from that hesitant start in 1948 in Havana (Cuba), via Annecy (France), Torquay (UK), Tokyo 
(Japan), Punta del Este (Uruguay), Montreal (Canada), Brussels (Belgium) and finally to Marrakesh (Morocco) 
in 1994.  During that period, the trading system came under GATT, salvaged from the aborted attempt to create 
the ITO. GATT helped establish a strong and prosperous multilateral trading system that became more and more 
liberal through rounds of trade negotiations. But by the 1980s the system needed a thorough overhaul. This led to 
the Uruguay Round, and ultimately to the WTO. 
5.1. GATT: ‘provisional’ for almost half a century 
From 1948 to 1994, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provided the rules for much of world 
trade and presided over periods that saw some of the highest growth rates in international commerce. It seemed 
well-established, but throughout those 47 years, it was a provisional agreement and organization. 
The original intention was to create a third institution to handle the trade side of international economic 
cooperation, joining the two “Bretton Woods” institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
Over 50 countries participated in negotiations to create an International Trade Organization (ITO) as a 
specialized agency of the United Nations. The draft ITO Charter was ambitious. It extended beyond world trade 
disciplines, to include rules on employment, commodity agreements, restrictive business practices, international 
investment, and services. The aim was to create the ITO at a UN Conference on Trade and Employment in 
Havana, Cuba in 1947. 
Meanwhile, 15 countries had begun talks in December 1945 to reduce and bind customs tariffs. With the Second 
World War only recently ended, they wanted to give an early boost to trade liberalization, and to begin to correct 
the legacy of protectionist measures which remained in place from the early 1930s. 
This first round of negotiations resulted in a package of trade rules and 45,000 tariff concessions affecting $10 
billion of trade, about one fifth of the world’s total. The group had expanded to 23 by the time the deal was 
signed on 30 October 1947. The tariff concessions came into effect by 30 June 1948 through a “Protocol of 
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Provisional Application”. And so the new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was born, with 23 founding 
members (officially “contracting parties”). 
The 23 were also part of the larger group negotiating the ITO Charter. One of the provisions of GATT says that 
they should accept some of the trade rules of the draft. This, they believed, should be done swiftly and 
“provisionally” in order to protect the value of the tariff concessions they had negotiated. They spelt out how 
they envisaged the relationship between GATT and the ITO Charter, but they also allowed for the possibility that 
the ITO might not be created. They were right. 
The Havana conference began on 21 November 1947, less than a month after GATT was signed. The ITO 
Charter was finally agreed in Havana in March 1948, but ratification in some national legislatures proved 
impossible. The most serious opposition was in the US Congress, even though the US government had been one 
of the driving forces. In 1950, the United States government announced that it would not seek Congressional 
ratification of the Havana Charter, and the ITO was effectively dead. So, the GATT became the only multilateral 
instrument governing international trade from 1948 until the WTO was established in 1995. 
For almost half a century, the GATT’s basic legal principles remained much as they were in 1948. There were 
additions in the form of a section on development added in the 1960s and “plurilateral” agreements (i.e. with 
voluntary membership) in the 1970s, and efforts to reduce tariffs further continued. Much of this was achieved 
through a series of multilateral negotiations known as “trade rounds” — the biggest leaps forward in 
international trade liberalization have come through these rounds which were held under GATT’s auspices. 
In the early years, the GATT trade rounds concentrated on further reducing tariffs. Then, the Kennedy Round in 
the mid-sixties brought about a GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement and a section on development. The Tokyo 
Round during the seventies was the first major attempt to tackle trade barriers that do not take the form of tariffs, 
and to improve the system. The eighth, the Uruguay Round of 1986–94, was the last and most extensive of all. It 
led to the WTO and a new set of agreements. 
Table (2): The GATT trade rounds 
Year Place/ name Subjects covered Countries 
1947 Geneva Tariffs 23 
1949 Annecy Tariffs 13 
1951 Torquay Tariffs 38 
1956 Geneva Tariffs 26 
1960–1961 Geneva (Dillon Round) Tariffs 26 
1964–1967 Geneva (Kennedy Round) Tariffs and anti-dumping measures 62 
1973–1979 Geneva (Tokyo Round) Tariffs, non-tariff measures, “framework” agreements 102 
1986–1994 Geneva (Uruguay Round) Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property, 
dispute settlement, textiles, agriculture, creation of WTO, etc 
123 
 
 
5.2. Did GATT succeed? 
GATT was provisional with a limited field of action, but its success over 47 years in promoting and securing the 
liberalization of much of world trade is incontestable. Continual reductions in tariffs alone helped spur very high 
rates of world trade growth during the 1950s and 1960s — around 8% a year on average. And the momentum of 
trade liberalization helped ensure that trade growth consistently out-paced production growth throughout the 
GATT era, a measure of countries’ increasing ability to trade with each other and to reap the benefits of trade. 
The rush of new members during the Uruguay Round demonstrated that the multilateral trading system was 
recognized as an anchor for development and an instrument of economic and trade reform. 
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But all was not well. As time passed new problems arose. The Tokyo Round in the 1970s was an attempt to 
tackle some of these but its achievements were limited. This was a sign of difficult times to come. 
GATT’s success in reducing tariffs to such a low level, combined with a series of economic recessions in the 
1970s and early 1980s, drove governments to devise other forms of protection for sectors facing increased 
foreign competition. High rates of unemployment and constant factory closures led governments in Western 
Europe and North America to seek bilateral market-sharing arrangements with competitors and to embark on a 
subsidies race to maintain their holds on agricultural trade. Both these changes undermined GATT’s credibility 
and effectiveness. 
The problem was not just a deteriorating trade policy environment. By the early 1980s the General Agreement 
was clearly no longer as relevant to the realities of world trade as it had been in the 1940s. For a start, world 
trade had become far more complex and important than 40 years before: the globalization of the world economy 
was underway, trade in services — not covered by GATT rules — was of major interest to more and more 
countries, and international investment had expanded. The expansion of services trade was also closely tied to 
further increases in world merchandise trade. In other respects, GATT had been found wanting. For instance, in 
agriculture, loopholes in the multilateral system were heavily exploited, and efforts at liberalizing agricultural 
trade met with little success. In the textiles and clothing sector, an exception to GATT’s normal disciplines was 
negotiated in the 1960s and early 1970s, leading to the Multifibre Arrangement. Even GATT’s institutional 
structure and its dispute settlement system were causing concern. 
These and other factors convinced GATT members that a new effort to reinforce and extend the multilateral 
system should be attempted. That effort resulted in the Uruguay Round, the Marrakesh Declaration, and the 
creation of the WTO. 
6. The agreements 
The WTO is ‘rules-based’; its rules are negotiated agreements 
6.1. Overview: a navigational guide 
The WTO agreements cover goods, services and intellectual property. They spell out the principles of 
liberalization, and the permitted exceptions. They include individual countries’ commitments to lower customs 
tariffs and other trade barriers, and to open and keep open services markets. They set procedures for settling 
disputes. They prescribe special treatment for developing countries. They require governments to make their 
trade policies transparent by notifying the WTO about laws in force and measures adopted, and through regular 
reports by the secretariat on countries’ trade policies. 
These agreements are often called the WTO’s trade rules, and the WTO is often described as “rules-based”, a 
system based on rules. But it’s important to remember that the rules are actually agreements that governments 
negotiated. 
This chapter focuses on the Uruguay Round agreements, which are the basis of the present WTO system. 
Additional work is also now underway in the WTO. This is the result of decisions taken at Ministerial 
Conferences, in particular the meeting in Doha, November 2001, when new negotiations and other work were 
launched. (More on the Doha Agenda, later) 
6.2. Six-part broad outline 
The table of contents of “The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal 
Texts” is a daunting list of about 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and understandings in fact, the agreements 
fall into a simple structure with six main parts: an umbrella agreement (the Agreement Establishing the WTO); 
agreements for each of the three broad areas of trade that the WTO covers (goods, services and intellectual 
property); dispute settlement; and reviews of governments’ trade policies. 
The agreements for the two largest areas — goods and services — share a common three-part outline, even 
though the detail is sometimes quite different. 
•  They start with broad principles: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (for goods), and 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). (The third area, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), also falls into this category although at present it has no additional parts.) 
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•  Then come extra agreements and annexes dealing with the special requirements of specific sectors or 
issues. 
•  Finally, there are the detailed and lengthy schedules (or lists) of commitments made by individual 
countries allowing specific foreign products or service-providers access to their markets. For GATT, these take 
the form of binding commitments on tariffs for goods in general, and combinations of tariffs and quotas for some 
agricultural goods. For GATS, the commitments state how much access foreign service providers are allowed for 
specific sectors, and they include lists of types of services where individual countries say they are not applying 
the “most-favoured-nation” principle of non-discrimination. 
Underpinning these are dispute settlement, which is based on the agreements and commitments, and trade policy 
reviews, an exercise in transparency. 
Much of the Uruguay Round dealt with the first two parts: general principles and principles for specific sectors. 
At the same time, market access negotiations were possible for industrial goods. Once the principles had been 
worked out, negotiations could proceed on the commitments for sectors such as agriculture and services.  
6.3. Additional agreements 
Another group of agreements not included in the diagram is also important: the two “plurilateral” agreements not 
signed by all members: civil aircraft and government procurement. 
Further changes on the horizon, the Doha Agenda: These agreements are not static; they are renegotiated from 
time to time and new agreements can be added to the package. Many are now being negotiated under the Doha 
Development Agenda, launched by WTO trade ministers in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. 
7. The WTO in global economic policy-making 
An important aspect of the WTO’s mandate is to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and other multilateral institutions to achieve greater coherence in global economic policy-making. A 
separate Ministerial Declaration was adopted at the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting in April 1994 to underscore 
this objective. 
The declaration envisages an increased contribution by the WTO to achieving greater coherence in global 
economic policy-making. It recognizes that different aspects of economic policy are linked, and it calls on the 
WTO to develop its cooperation with the international organizations responsible for monetary and financial 
matters — the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
The declaration also recognizes the contribution that trade liberalization makes to the growth and development of 
national economies. It says this is an increasingly important component in the success of the economic 
adjustment programmes which many WTO members are undertaking, even though it may often involve 
significant social costs during the transition. 
7.1. Transparency (1): keeping the WTO informed 
Often the only way to monitor whether commitments are being implemented fully is by requiring countries to 
notify the WTO promptly when they take relevant actions. Many WTO agreements say member governments 
have to notify the WTO Secretariat of new or modified trade measures. For example, details of any new anti-
dumping or countervailing legislation, new technical standards affecting trade, changes to regulations affecting 
trade in services, and laws or regulations concerning the intellectual property agreement — they all have to be 
notified to the appropriate body of the WTO. Special groups are also established to examine new free-trade 
arrangements and the trade policies of countries joining as new members. 
7.2. Transparency (2): keeping the public informed 
The main public access to the WTO is the website, www.wto.org. News of the latest developments are published 
daily. Background information and explanations of a wide range of issues — including “Understanding the 
WTO” — are also available. And those wanting to follow the nitty-gritty of WTO work can consult or download 
an ever-increasing number of official documents, now over 150,000, in Documents Online. 
On 14 May 2002, the General Council decided to make more documents available to the public as soon as they 
are circulated. It also decided that the minority of documents that are restricted should be made public more 
quickly — after about two months, instead of the previous six. This was the second major decision on 
transparency. On 18 July 1996, the General Council had agreed to make more information about WTO activities 
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available publicly and decided that public information, including derestricted WTO documents, would be 
accessible on-line. 
The objective is to make more information available to the public. An important channel is through the media, 
with regular briefings on all major meetings for journalists in Geneva — and increasingly by email and other 
means for journalists around the world. 
Meanwhile, over the years, the WTO Secretariat has enhanced its dialogue with civil society — non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) interested in the WTO, parliamentarians, students, academics, and other 
groups. 
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Current WTO members 
 
148 governments, on February 2005, with date of membership (“g” = the 51 original GATT members who 
joined after 1 January 1995; “n” = new members joining the WTO through a working party negotiation): 
 
 
Albania 8 September 2000 (n) 
Angola 1 December 1996 (g) 
Antigua and Barbuda 1 January 1995 
Argentina 1 January 1995 
Armenia 5 February 2003 (n) 
Australia 1 January 1995 
Austria 1 January 1995 
Bahrain 1 January 1995 
Bangladesh 1 January 1995 
Barbados 1 January 1995 
Belgium 1 January 1995 
Belize 1 January 1995 
Benin 22 February 1996 (g) 
Bolivia 13 September 1995 (g) 
Botswana 31 May 1995 (g) 
Brazil 1 January 1995 
Brunei Darussalam 1 January 1995 
Bulgaria 1 December 1996 (n) 
Burkina Faso 3 June 1995 (g) 
Burundi 23 July 1995 (g) 
Cambodia 13 October 2004 (n) 
Cameroon 13 December 1995 (g) 
Canada 1 January 1995 
Central African Republic 31 May 1995 (g) 
Chad 19 October 1996 (g) 
Chile 1 January 1995 
China 11 December 2001 (n) 
Colombia 30 April 1995 (g) 
Congo 27 March 1997 (g) 
Costa Rica 1 January 1995 
Côte d’Ivoire 1 January 1995 
Croatia 30 November 2000 (n) 
Cuba 20 April 1995 (g) 
Cyprus 30 July 1995 (g) 
Czech Republic 1 January 1995 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 January 1997 (g) 
Denmark 1 January 1995 
Djibouti 31 May 1995 (g) 
Dominica 1 January 1995 
Dominican Republic 9 March 1995 (g) 
Ecuador 21 January 1996 (n) 
Egypt 30 June 1995 (g) 
El Salvador 7 May 1995 (g) 
Estonia 13 November 1999 (n) 
European Union 1 January 1995 
Fiji 14 January 1996 (g) 
Finland 1 January 1995 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 4 April 2003 (n) 
France 1 January 1995 
Gabon 1 January 1995 
Gambia 23 October 1996 (g) 
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Georgia 14 June 2000 (n) 
Germany 1 January 1995 
Ghana 1 January 1995 
Greece 1 January 1995 
Grenada 22 February 1996 (g) 
Guatemala 21 July 1995 (g) 
Guinea Bissau 31 May 1995 (g) 
Guinea 25 October 1995 (g) 
Guyana 1 January 1995 
Haiti 30 January 1996 (g) 
Honduras 1 January 1995 
Hong Kong, China 1 January 1995 
Hungary 1 January 1995 
Iceland 1 January 1995 
India 1 January 1995 
Indonesia 1January 1995 
Ireland 1 January 1995 
Israel 21 April 1995 (g) 
Italy 1 January 1995 
Jamaica 9 March 1995 (g) 
Jordan 11 April 2000 (n) 
Japan 1 January 1995 
Kenya 1 January 1995 
Korea 1 January 1995 
Kuwait 1 January 1995 
Kyrgyz Republic 20 December 1998 (n) 
Latvia 10 February 1999 (n) 
Lesotho 31 May 1995 (g) 
Liechtenstein 1 September 1995 (g) 
Lithuania 31 May 2001 (n) 
Luxembourg 1 January 1995 
Macao, China 1 January 1995 
Madagascar 17 November 1995 (g) 
Malawi 31 May 1995 (g) 
Malaysia 1 January 1995 
Maldives 31 May 1995 (g) 
Mali 31 May 1995 (g) 
Malta 1 January 1995 
Mauritania 31 May 1995 (g) 
Mauritius 1 January 1995 
Mexico 1 January 1995 
Moldova 26 July 2001 (n) 
Mongolia 29 January 1997 (n) 
Morocco 1 January 1995 
Mozambique 26 August 1995 (g) 
Myanmar 1 January 1995 
Namibia 1 January 1995 
Nepal 23 April 2004 (n) 
Netherlands — including Netherlands Antilles 1 January 1995 
New Zealand 1 January 1995 
Nicaragua 3 September 1995 (g) 
Niger 13 December 1996 (g) 
Nigeria 1 January 1995 
Norway 1 January 1995 
Oman 9 November 2000 (n) 
Pakistan 1 January 1995 
Panama 6 September 1997 (n) 
Papua New Guinea 9 June 1996 (g) 
Paraguay 1 January 1995 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.41, 2016 
 
61 
Peru 1 January 1995 
Philippines 1 January 1995 
Poland 1 July 1995 (g) 
Portugal 1 January 1995 
Qatar 13 January 1996 (g) 
Romania 1 January 1995 
Rwanda 22 May 1996 (g) 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 21 February 1996 (n) 
Saint Lucia 1 January 1995 
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 1 January 1995 
Senegal 1 January 1995 
Sierra Leone 23 July 1995 (g) 
Singapore 1 January 1995 
Slovak Republic 1 January 1995 
Slovenia 30 July 1995 (g) 
Solomon Islands 26 July 1996 (g) 
South Africa 1 January 1995 
Spain 1 January 1995 
Sri Lanka 1 January 1995 
Suriname 1 January 1995 
Swaziland 1 January 1995 
Sweden 1 January 1995 
Switzerland 1 July 1995 (g) 
Chinese Taipei 1 January 2002 (n) 
Tanzania 1 January 1995 
Thailand 1 January 1995 
Togo 31 May 1995 (g) 
Trinidad and Tobago 1 March 1995 (g) 
Tunisia 29 March 1995 (g) 
Turkey 26 March 1995 (g) 
Uganda 1 January 1995 
United Arab Emirates 10 April 1996 (g) 
United Kingdom 1 January 1995 
United States 1 January 1995 
Uruguay 1 January 1995 
Venezuela 1 January 1995 
Zambia 1 January 1995 
Zimbabwe 3 March 1995 (g) 
 
 
 
